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Abstract
Java's security allows a user to import and run ap-
plets from the Web without undue risk to the user's
machine by restricting the applet's actions to a \sand-
box", an area of the web browser dedicated to that
applet. The sandbox model is critical to Java's success
and its promise of truly network-oriented computing.
Applications running in the sandbox can only access
local and network resources through a limited number
of trusted mechanisms. This model gives users the ad-
vantage of easy distribution of software while protect-
ing them from potentially malicious applications, but
can be too restrictive at times. To address the need to
extend the exibility of the \all-or-nothing" approach,
the concept of object signing was introduced to the
Java model. Access to resources outside the sandbox
is granted based on a user-dened policy consisting of
a list of code signers and the type of access each signer
is allowed. While this policy works well for restrict-
ing access to \trusted" code from a well-known signer,
non-malicious, entertaining or educational code from
individual programmers or small businesses is cast out,
unless privileges for each signed authority are incor-
porated into the user's access matrix. In this paper
we propose that the privileges required by code from
unknown sources be veried and signed by a single
trusted third party and present an infrastructure to
facilitate this proposal. We then describe a parallel
application built on top of the Charlotte [2] parallel
processing system and an order inventory database ap-
plication as exemplars of this approach.
1 Introduction
Consider the following scenario. Alice wants to run
her parallel processing code on Bob's machine. She
has written her code to take advantage of a trusted
code base from BigDeveloper Inc. Her code is non-
malicious, and requires the full privileges of classes
provided within BigDeveloper's software development
kit. Unfortunately Bob has no reason to trust Al-
ice, and refuses to grant her code the necessary priv-
ileges. Due to the nature of Java's extended stack
introspection, in which the security model assigns run-
time privileges based on the consensus voting rule [6],
Alice's parallel processing code is never correctly ex-
ecuted. Alice cannot obtain higher privileges for her
code since these privileges are assigned by Bob on the
basis of the principal responsible for the code source,
and Alice runs a small operation that is virtually un-
known.
This scenario is not unusual. Users are continually
encountering code on the Web that cannot be trusted,
and in the absence of other information are forced for
their own safety to deny it the privileges necessary
for its execution. In essence, this means that full use
of the Web is denied to both users and the developers
providing them with a trusted computing base. Even if
Alice and her many counterparts obtained digital IDs
and had their code signed by certifying authorities,
Bob would still face the tedious administrative task
of assigning each principal to a particular entry in his
access matrix.
We are proposing a certication procedure based on
a single trusted third party who is given a set of priv-
ileges on the users' machine, and who can guarantee
varied levels of safety of (in this case) Alice's code if
it conforms to certain restrictions. The benets are
two-fold. Firstly, the user is no longer responsible for
the administration of the security privileges assigned
to each code source. In addition, smaller code sources
can utilize the full power of trusted libraries without
danger of harm to the user.
In the next few sections we discuss some issues per-
taining to the implementation of code signing in the
two most prominent browsers. We then discuss our
proposal for a third party verier, outline a method
for the third party to verify the code, and discuss two
applications that benet from our proposals.
2 Object Signing
Object signing is a mechanism which allows users to
obtain reliable information about downloaded classes
by using standard cryptographic techniques such as
one-way hash functions and message authentication
checks. Reliable software distribution over the In-
ternet poses many serious security problems, most
notably ensuring safety, integrity and accountability.
Object signing has been proposed as a solution to the
latter two problems. Integrity means that the byte
stream has not been interfered with and altered dur-
ing transit, and accountability means that the code
should be associated to a particular identiable prin-
cipal.
The use of object signing in Java facilitates oper-
ations beyond the dened limits of the sandbox en-
vironment. Such extended operations include le ac-
cess and establishing arbitrary network connections.
The burden of determining to what granularity these
normally restricted accesses are granted, and which
signers are permitted access, is left entirely up to net-
work administrators and users. While this approach
permits a ne-grained continuum of access privileges
from relatively innocuous operations [4], creating and
managing a user's access matrix can be somewhat bur-
densome.
The Java object signing model is based on the no-
tion of capabilities [3], which has existed in the se-
curity component of many novel systems such as Taos
[7] and Amoeba [5] for quite some time. A capability
is a pointer to a controlled system resource that can-
not be duplicated, thus protecting the resource from
misuse. A program that wishes to use a controlled re-
source must do so through a capability, but the ability
to use a capability needs to be explicitly assigned to
the requesting program, either during its initialization
or by a call to another capability.
In Java, object signing reduces to a capability based
system where digital signatures which accompany an
applet are represented as principals, resources are rep-
resented by targets, and the privileges associated with
a principal represent the authorization for a principal
to access a specic target [4]. These signatures repre-
sent endorsements of the code by the signer, asserting
that the code is not malicious and behaves as adver-
tised [6].
The extended stack introspection mechanism imple-
mented by both Netscape and Microsoft uses digital
signatures to match pieces of incoming byte code to
principals, and consults a policy engine to determine
which system targets should be enabled for a particu-
lar principal. Microsoft's approach to handling digital
signatures is to allow only one signature on each piece
of code, and each signature contains a list of targets
to which the signer thinks the code should be given
access. By contrast, Netscape's approach allows for
multiple signers, with no a priori mention of targets.
In Netscape, because of the possibility of multiple
signers for a particular class, the policy engine uses
a consensus voting rule to determine which privileges
are granted on behalf of the signers. Intuitively, con-
sensus voting means that one negative vote can force
access to be forbidden, while at least one positive vote
(and no negative votes) is required in order to allow
access to a target [6]. When a privilege is enabled,
an annotation is recorded on the call stack of the re-
questing thread, so that by querying the call stack for
these annotations, future calls to the policy engine are
avoided. However, when a method call crosses classes
with dierently signed principals, the enabled privi-
leges are hidden. Therefore, for Alice's code to move
beyond the sandbox and execute correctly with, for
example, \networking" privileges, the signature of a
more trusted principal is needed.
3 Verier
In this section, we describe the third party verica-
tion method and present one possible framework that
supports its implementation for a restricted but large
class of applications.
Third party verication is a method by which Java's
security model is extended (without changing the JVM
implementation) to allow trusted third parties to grant
well-behaved applications the privileges necessary to
access restricted system targets. In this way, well-
behaved applications from small companies can be
granted access to targets outside the Java sandbox
without having to explicitly trust the primary prin-
cipal associated with the code source. Trust is placed
in the third party who is delegated the responsibility
for verifying that the code is well-behaved.
The proposed verication process proceeds as fol-
lows. Alice sends her code and a request to be granted
privileges for target(s) fpg to the third party verier
1
The verier checks whether Alice's code attempts to
perform any malicious operations with the fpg tar-
gets, and if not, signs her code with the signature
which grants privileges for fpg. Alice's code may be
executed by any user that grants the third party the
1
Our implementation requires that the list of requested tar-
gets precedes the code, as is the case with Microsoft's imple-
mentation of object signing.
Figure 1: Alice sends her code to the third party ver-
ier.
proper privileges. This is depicted schematically in
Figure 1. It is important to note that the third party
verier does not need to verify the overall safety of
Alice's code: the use of restricted targets not in fpg
is controlled by the standard Java security manager.
Figure 2 shows Alice's code being executed on Bob's
machine.
The third party verication method is only useful
when there is a method of verifying that an applica-
tion will use the targets that it has requested in an
innocuous fashion. In the rest of this section, we pro-
pose a framework that facilitates this verication and
show how a simple order inventory application and a
parallel application are supported within this frame-
work.
The framework we propose is simple: a trusted
source, BigDeveloper Inc, creates a high-level library
that accesses restricted targets in such a way that if
the library is used in a prescribed manner, the use
will be innocuous. The application developer, Alice,
then writes her code using the library in the prescribed
manner and requests that the third party verier at-
test to this so that the end-user Bob will grant her
code the privileges necessary to use the library. The
third party verier checks that Alice's code does in
fact use the library in the prescribed manner and in
addition that the code does not abuse any privileges it
may acquire by deliberately or accidentally accessing
restricted targets without using the library. In this
way, restricted targets can be made available to ap-
plication builders while still protecting the end-user's
Figure 2: Bob downloads Alice's code from the Web
and runs it.
execution environment.
The library must be high-level enough that it can-
not be used for purposes other than it is intended. For
example, a socket library that allows Alice to open
a socket, and read and write byte streams from the
socket is too low-level because she could use it to per-
form third party attacks. On the other hand, if the
library provides high-level shared memory operations
and is such that it can only communicate with other
instances of the same library (as is the case, for exam-
ple, with Charlotte as discussed below), then it is safe
to allow Alice to use it.
We denote the targets that the library uses as L
t
and the manner in which the library must be used as
L
m
. We now describe a parallel processing application
built using a parallel library, and a simple inventory
and order database application built using a database
library.
We use Charlotte [2] as our model of a parallel pro-
cessing library. Charlotte [2] leverages Java and the
Calypso [1] programming model to provide a power-
ful metacomputing substrate for the WWW. The pro-
gramming model is simple, consisting of parallel loops
and CREW distributed shared memory. Load balanc-
ing and fault tolerance are provided transparently by
the runtime system, and the Charlotte library is writ-
ten entirely in Java. The Charlotte system we describe
is slightly modied so that it meets the requirements
of a library in our framework.
The Charlotte library communicates with a Char-
lotte Manager through a socket. The Java socket
library is the only restricted parameterized tar-
get that the Charlotte library uses (i.e., L
t
=
fNetworkConnectg). In Charlotte, all applica-
tion communication is done through shared memory
\read"s and \write"s. Although the application can
cause data to be read and written to and from the
Charlotte socket connection, it is greatly restricted be-
cause at a low-level, that data is packaged and sent in a
Charlotte specic way. For example, when the connec-
tion is rst established the String \ am Alice's Char-
lotte Worker"is the rst data sent and the library will
throw an exception if the String \ am Alice's Charlotte
Manager" is not received.
The manner in which the use of the library is re-
stricted, expressed by L
m
, states that the ratio of com-
munication to computation must be low in order to
prevent denial of service attacks.
The third party verication for an application that
uses Charlotte simply consists of checking that the ap-
plication does not use sockets except via the Char-
lotte library, and that the amount of communication
is much less than the amount of computation
2
.
Our second example application is a simple ordering
and inventory control database for small companies
who want to distribute applets to current and prospec-
tive customers. In this type of application, only simple
user input forms and database transactions are neces-
sary. A simple database interface library is used to
allow these applications to access their databases.
The library uses a parameterized system target and
L
t
= fUniversalNetworkConnectg. We restrict its
use so that it may only connect to machines in the
application developer's domain. In this way, we en-
sure that Alice does not try to attack her competi-
tor's databases, but she is free to access any of her
databases around the world. Because Alice is only al-
lowed to connect to databases within her company's
domain, we can allow her to perform any operation as
many times as she likes with the library. We could
also allow Alice to read and write to a single le in a
specied directory using this method.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed third party verication
as a method to permit applets to move beyond the con-
ned limits of the Java security sandbox. We proposed
an implementation framework of third party veri-
cation based on having applications use well-dened,
2
In our prototype implementation, we restrict loops to de-
pend on constants and do not allow recursion; thus we can check
this ratio
high-level libraries to access restricted targets. In the
future, we plan on performing a more rigorous exami-
nation of the proposed model, and to explore alterna-
tive implementation frameworks.
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